The transformation of the business angel market:Empirical evidence and research implications by Mason, Colin et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The transformation of the business angel market
Citation for published version:
Mason, C, Botelho, T & Harrison, R 2016, 'The transformation of the business angel market: Empirical
evidence and research implications' Venture Capital, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 321-344. DOI:
10.1080/13691066.2016.1229470
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1080/13691066.2016.1229470
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Venture Capital
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=tvec20
Download by: [The University of Edinburgh] Date: 07 March 2017, At: 05:35
Venture Capital
An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance
ISSN: 1369-1066 (Print) 1464-5343 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tvec20
The transformation of the business angel market:
empirical evidence and research implications
Colin Mason, Tiago Botelho & Richard Harrison
To cite this article: Colin Mason, Tiago Botelho & Richard Harrison (2016) The transformation of
the business angel market: empirical evidence and research implications, Venture Capital, 18:4,
321-344, DOI: 10.1080/13691066.2016.1229470
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13691066.2016.1229470
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 14 Sep 2016.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 205
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Citing articles: 2 View citing articles 
Venture Capital, 2016
VOl. 18, nO. 4, 321–344
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13691066.2016.1229470
The transformation of the business angel market: empirical 
evidence and research implications
Colin Masona, Tiago Botelhob and Richard Harrisonc
aadam Smith Business School, university of Glasgow, Glasgow, uK; bnorwich Business School, university of 
east anglia, norwich, uK; cuniversity of edinburgh Management School, university of edinburgh, edinburgh, 
uK
ABSTRACT
Business angel investing – a key source of finance for entrepreneurial 
businesses – is rapidly evolving from a fragmented and largely 
anonymous activity dominated by individuals investing on their 
own to one that is increasingly characterised by groups of investors 
investing together through managed angel groups. The implications 
of this change have been largely ignored by scholars. The paper 
examines the investment activity and operation of angel groups in 
Scotland to highlight the implications of this change for the nature 
of angel investing. It goes on to argue that this transformation 
challenges both the ongoing relevance of prior research on business 
angels and current methodological practices, and raises a set of new 
research questions.
Introduction
Meyer (2011, 6) has recently criticised entrepreneurship research for becoming method 
centred and increasingly based on the sophisticated manipulation of databases which, he 
argues, ‘distance researchers from actual people and behaviours that catalyse entrepreneurs 
and entrepreneurship’. This has several implications for entrepreneurship research. First, 
research topics are chosen on the basis of the availability of data-sets rather than their 
intellectual or practical significance. Second, it results in a detachment from the ‘real world’ 
of the entrepreneur which, in turn, creates the risk that processes and changes, for example, 
in terms of actors, institutions and behaviour, go unobserved, and research loses its relevance. 
As a consequence, the ability of scholars to contribute to policy and practice is reduced.
These concerns are particularly evident in business angel research. The invisible nature 
of business angels, the lack of databases which capture their investments and the reluctance 
amongst the small population of visible angels to take part in surveys have meant that the 
topic has attracted relatively little research. In addition, its methodological sophistication 
has been weak, especially in comparison with venture capital and private equity research 
which have attracted significantly more studies, many of them based on quantitative research 
methods. This is at odds with the relative importance of these sources of entrepreneurial 
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finance: business angels finance significantly more businesses than venture capital funds 
(VCFs), and at the start-up stage, the amount that they invest is also greater (Mason and 
Harrison 2000a; Sohl 2012; eBAn 2015).
This paper examines how the angel market is changing quite fundamentally from an 
atomistic, fragmented and largely invisible market comprising almost entirely individuals 
investing on their own or in ad hoc small groups to one that is increasingly characterised by 
highly visible angel groups and syndicates which consolidate and channel finance from 
individual investors to entrepreneurial ventures. The implications of this evolution of the 
angel market have been largely ignored by scholars. The consequence is that our under-
standing of the operation of the market remains based on studies of individual angels – 
which is now only part of the overall angel market – and does not provide insights into the 
operation and investment activity of angel groups. This paper is the first to explicitly and 
systematically examine this transformation of the angel market. It builds on previous papers 
on the overall evolution of the early stage risk capital market (Harrison, Don and Johnston 
2010), the evolution of specific business angel groups (Gregson, Carr and Harrison 2013), 
group investment decision-making (Carpentier and Suret 2015; Croce, Tenca and Ughetto 
2016; Mason and Botelho 2016) and the emergence of the angel group gatekeeper as a new 
actor in the market (Paul and Whittam 2010). Based on a case study of Scotland, where this 
market evolution has proceeded the furthest, the paper addresses the following key issues. 
First, what are the implications of the growth of angel groups for the financing of entrepre-
neurial ventures? Second, to what extent does this render redundant our existing under-
standing of the investment process which is derived from studies based on individual 
investors? Third, what are implications for methodology? And finally, what are the research 
questions that arise as a consequence of this change?
The next section of the paper discusses the drivers that are transforming the nature of 
angel investing. This is followed by an examination of the angel market in Scotland where 
this change has proceeded the furthest outside of the USA. The final section examines the 
implications of this change for future research on business angels.
The changing nature of business angel investing
Business angels – a definition
Business angels can be defined as high net worth individuals (HnWIs) who invest their own 
money, either alone or with others, directly in unquoted businesses in which there is no 
family connection. They normally invest in the form of equity finance in the hope of achieving 
a significant financial return through some form of exit. Typically, they will also take an active 
involvement in their investee businesses (Mason 2006). Investments by business angels are 
largely focused on new and early stage technology ventures (Giudici and Paleari 2000; Madill, 
Haines, and Riding 2005; Mason and Harrison 2010, 2011). They are particularly important 
from a regional economic development perspective because the majority of their invest-
ments are local (Avdeitchikova 2009; Harrison, Mason and Robson 2010); hence, they are 
typically recycling and reinvesting locally created wealth (e.g. from the sale of a business – 
Mason and Harrison 2006). Given the geographical concentration of venture capital investing 
in core regions (Mason and Harrison 2002a; Zook 2004; Mason 2007; Mason and Pierrakis 
2013), business angels are particularly important in peripheral regions.
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The importance of business angels in supporting the development of a dynamic entre-
preneurial economy has been recognised by both national and regional governments in 
various countries. Angel investment activity is encouraged in a variety of ways, notably 
through tax incentives and support for business angel networks and other types of inter-
mediary which introduce angels and entrepreneurs seeking finance to one another (Mason 
2009a; oeCD 2011). The recent establishment of co-investment schemes has also helped, 
either directly or indirectly, to boost angel investment activity (owen and Mason, 
Forthcoming). This has brought business angel investing into the realm of economic devel-
opment, giving government a legitimate interest in what would otherwise be a private 
activity. The different objectives of investors and government departments and agencies 
create a potential source of tension, an issue that we revisit in the conclusion.
The emergence of angel networks and groups
Angel networks
In the 1980s and 1990s, angels operated anonymously, investing for the most part on their 
own or with small groups of friends and business associates in ventures that they came 
across through their personal social and business networks. not surprisingly, the angel 
market operated inefficiently, with both investors and entrepreneurs incurring high search 
costs in identifying one another, and often giving up as a result (Wetzel 1986). It was very 
much an ad hoc activity for most investors and levels of professionalism were correspondingly 
low (Blair 1996). Meanwhile, entrepreneurs typically did not understand how to make 
themselves ‘investment ready’ (Mason and Harrison 2001, 2002b). An early market 
intervention, pioneered in the USA (Wetzel 1984; Wetzel and Freear 1996) and Canada (Blatt 
and Riding 1996) and subsequently adopted in europe, was the creation of business angel 
networks – essentially introduction services – which provided a communication channel to 
enable entrepreneurs to get their investment proposal to the attention of potential investors 
and for angels to examine investment opportunities without compromising their privacy 
(Mason and Harrison 1996a). Subsequently, some of these networks also delivered investment 
readiness programmes (Mason and Harrison 2001; Mason and Kwok 2010) and angel training 
(San José, Roure, and Aernoudt 2005). The difficulties in developing a commercially viable 
model for this service has meant that most networks have relied on government funding, 
and several in the UK have closed after losing this support. Those which operate commercially 
levy a fee on the investments that they facilitate. This business model requires a focus on 
larger deals (Mason and Harrison 1997). evidence on the effectiveness of networks is mixed 
but broadly positive (Mason and Harrison 1996b, 1999, 2002b; Collewaert, Manigart, and 
Aernoudt 2010).
Angel groups
The angel market began to transform in the late 1990s as angels started to organise them-
selves into groups to invest collectively. This trend has proceeded furthest in the USA. The 
Band of Angels, which was founded in Silicon Valley in 1995, is generally – but inaccurately 
(see below) – regarded as the first organised group to be formed. others, such as Tech Coast 
Angels (1997), Sierra Angels (1997), Common Angels (1997) and The Dinner Club (1999), 
soon followed (Preston 2007). Between 1996 and 2006, the number of identifiable business 
angel organisations in the US grew from 10 to over 250 (Preston 2007). The Angel Capital 
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Association, covering the USA and Canada, was created in 2003 for the purposes of trans-
ferring best practice, lobbying and data collection. It now comprises more than 240 formal 
angel groups, plus some affiliate members. There is growing evidence of specialisation by 
industry sector (e.g. health care angel groups) and type of investor (e.g. women-only angel 
groups). In europe, there has been a similar expansion in the angel market but with the 
exception of Scotland (Harrison, Don and Johnston 2010; Gregson, Mann and Harrison 2013a) 
– which is the focus for this paper – it has evolved differently, favouring angel networks 
which, as noted above, provide mechanisms connecting angels with entrepreneurs seeking 
finance (Mason 2009a). In the case of Scotland, the number of identifiable groups has grown 
from 2 to over 20 between 2000 and 2012, the most radical shift in market organisation of 
any region in europe. Moreover, Archangel Investors, the oldest and largest such group, was 
founded in 1992, and so is older than its better known US counterparts. Indeed, if Scotland 
was a US state, it would be the 11th largest in terms of angel group investment activity in 
absolute terms, whereas it ranks only 29th in terms of GDP per capita (Grahame, personal 
communication). Angel groups are now found throughout the world (oeCD 2011). However, 
scholars have been slow to react to this organisational transformation of the angel market. 
The literature base comprises a handful of case studies (mainly written by practitioners) (May 
and Simmons 2001; Cerullo and Sommer 2002; May 2002; Payne and Mccarty 2002; May and 
o’Halloran 2003) and just a few scholarly studies (Sudek 2006; Gregson, Mann and Harrison 
2013a; Carpentier and Suret 2015; Croce, Tenca and Ughetto 2016) and general discussion 
(Mason 2006; Sohl 2007, 2012).
Angel groups have emerged for two main reasons. First, business angels have difficulties 
in investing alongside VCFs because of the investment instruments which VCFs use, notably, 
liquidation preferences, anti-dilution rights, special subscription rights and enhanced fol-
low-on rights. This became apparent during the dot.com crash of the early 2000s. At this 
time, many of the companies that had been financed in the ‘bubble’ of the late 1990s were 
running out of cash. The huge fall in valuations in the crash meant that venture capitalists 
had to write down the value of many of the investments that they had already made. The 
consequence was that those companies that did raise further funding were refinanced at 
lower prices. As the initial investors in these businesses, angels were particularly vulnerable 
in these, so-called, down-rounds. Unable, or unwilling, to provide new cash, their investments 
were typically wiped out. This resulted in angels losing trust in venture capitalists and since 
then, many have sought to avoid investing in deals that are likely to require follow-on funding 
from venture capitalists. This, in turn, has led to a growing segmentation in the early stage 
risk capital market (Harrison, Don and Johnston 2010). A further difficulty is that business 
angels and VCFs have different objectives. This is particularly clear at the exit stage where, 
as Peters (2009) has noted, VCFs will refuse to exit at a valuation that is perfectly acceptable 
to angel investors but is below their ‘hurdle rate’ because it would affect their ability to raise 
a new fund. Second, the decline in the venture capital industry and its reorientation to larger, 
later stage deals since the dot.com crash (Clark 2014) have meant that opportunities for 
angels to pass on their investments to VCFs for follow-on funding are much more restricted, 
necessitating angels to make follow-on investments themselves. In other words, as the mar-
ket has evolved, there are fewer opportunities for sequential investment complementarities 
between the angel and VC investor communities (Freear and Wetzel 1990; Harrison and 
Mason 2000).
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These developments have prompted individual angels to recognise the advantages of 
investing as part of a group rather than on their own, the most important of which are the 
volume and quality of the deal flow, reducing the personal effort involved in the investment 
process, and the sharing of experience and knowledge, for example, in the evaluation and 
due diligence stages (Mason and Botelho 2014). other attractions of groups are that they 
enable individual angels to invest in particular opportunities that they could never have 
invested in as individuals, offer the opportunity to learn from more experienced investors 
and provide opportunities for camaraderie and networking with like-minded individuals. 
Moreover, by grouping together, they can aggregate their investment capacity and so have 
the ability to make bigger investments and follow-on investments, with the potential to take 
businesses to an exit themselves without the need for follow-on funding from VCFs. Several 
US groups have also established sidecar funds, pooled investment vehicles that invest along-
side the angel group. These open up angel investing to HnWIs who want to be passive 
investors. They also enable group members to allocate part of their funds in a balanced 
manner across all of the group’s investments. The presence of the sidecar fund enables the 
group to lead bigger investment rounds than the group of members themselves could afford.
The emergence of angel groups is of enormous significance for the development and 
maintenance of an entrepreneurial economy. First, they reduce sources of inefficiency in the 
market which have arisen on account of the fragmented and invisible nature of angels. There 
were few other mechanisms for angels to receive a steady flow of investment opportunities. 
Angel groups, in contrast, are generally visible and are therefore easier for entrepreneurs to 
approach, thereby reducing the search costs of both entrepreneurs and angels and increas-
ing deal flow. A further source of inefficiency was that each investment made by an angel 
has typically been a one-off that was screened, evaluated and negotiated separately. 
However, the volume of investments that angel groups make enables them to develop 
efficient routines for handling investment enquiries, screening opportunities and making 
investment agreements. The increased number of investors scrutinising potential risks also 
improves due diligence.
Second, angel groups have stimulated the supply side of the market. The advantages of 
investing as part of a group have also been attractive to HnWIs who would not otherwise 
consider investing in emerging companies, for example, because they lack the time, referral 
sources, investment skills or ability to add value. Hence, angel groups are able to attract and 
mobilise funds that might otherwise have been invested elsewhere (e.g. property, stock 
market or collecting: Mason and Harrison 2000b), thereby increasing the supply of early 
stage venture capital, and to invest it more efficiently and effectively.
Third, angel groups are helping fill the ‘new’ equity gap. The diminished number of VCFs 
have consistently raised their minimum size of investment and are increasingly abandoning 
the early stage market, either to invest in larger and later stage deals or simply because they 
have been unable to raise new funds from institutional investors (Mason 2009b; Clark 2014).1 
Angel groups are now increasingly the only source of funding for new and emerging busi-
nesses seeking investments in the range £250,000–£1 million (under $1 m in the USA: Sohl 
2012). Moreover, as a consequence of their greater financial resources, angel groups have 
the ability to provide follow-on funding. This overcomes one of the potential problems of 
raising money from individual business angels, namely that they often lack the financial 
capacity to provide follow-on funding. Consequently, the entrepreneur is forced to embark 
on a further search for finance. Moreover, in the event that the need for additional finance 
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is urgent, then both the entrepreneur and the solo angel will find themselves in a weak 
negotiating position with potential new investors, resulting in a dilution in their investments 
and the imposition of harsh terms and conditions. With the withdrawal of many VCFs from 
the small end of the market, individual angels and their investee businesses have increasingly 
been faced with the problem of the absence of follow-on investors. Because angel groups 
generally have greater financial firepower than individual angels or ad hoc angel groups to 
be able to provide follow-on financing, they are a more efficient source of finance for an 
entrepreneur because it avoids the need to start the search for finance anew each time a 
new round of funding is required.
Fourth, the ability of angel groups to add value to their investments should be much 
greater. The range of business expertise that is found amongst angel group members – 
described by May and Simmons (2001, 156), leading angel group practitioners in the USA, 
as a ‘smorgasbord of advice and strategic services’ – means that in most circumstances they 
are able to contribute much greater value added to investee businesses than an individual 
business angel, or even most early stage VCFs. It has also been shown that the accreditation 
role of angel groups enables businesses that have raised finance from angel groups to more 
easily raise follow-on funding from VCFs (lerner et al. 2015). Finally, angel groups are the 
most frequent partners in public sector co-investment schemes (Mason 2009a; Harrison, 
Don and Johnston 2010), acting as the focal point for the leveraging of additional funds into 
the entrepreneurial ecosystem.
However, others are less sanguine about the emergence of angel groups. For example, 
Sohl (2012, 37) has suggested that ‘as angels are becoming more organised they are mor-
phing into a portrait of venture capital funds and are losing some of the valuable character-
istics of the angel investor …’2 This, in turn, raises two specific concerns (Sohl 2007, 2012). 
First, the emergence of angel groups will result in a reallocation of angel capital away from 
smaller, seed investing to bigger and later stage deals. Second, angel groups will simply 
attract ‘inexperienced wealthy individuals seeking a passive investment’ rather than active 
angels who can contribute value added to their investee businesses (Sohl 2007, 360). But 
whether these developments are inevitable remains contested. Concerns have also been 
expressed about the cost raising finance, and specifically the practice of some angel groups 
requiring entrepreneurs to ‘pay to pitch’ (entrevestor.com 2013) and taking fees in the form 
of a proportion of any funds that they raise.
Data sources and analysis
This study is based on two sources: aggregate data on investment activity, which provides 
the basis for the next section, and interviews with angel group gatekeepers which is the key 
source for the following sections. Quantitative information on angel investment activity is 
derived from lInC Scotland (the trade body for angel groups in Scotland) and the Scottish 
Risk Capital Market Reports published by Young Company Finance in conjunction with 
Scottish enterprise (Young Company Finance 2012, 2014, 2015). lInC Scotland provided 
information on aggregate investment activity of angel groups complied on the basis of data 
provided by its members. The Scottish Risk Capital Market Reports are based on an exami-
nation of Companies House 88(2) returns for all companies that were known to have raised 
equity finance in the appropriate time period. These returns give the date and number of 
new shares issued, in most cases the price, but not the names of the investors which had to 
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be identified from other sources (see Mason and Harrison [2008] and Harrison, Don and 
Johnston [2010] for further discussion of this source).
This is complemented by information from 22 semi-structured interviews with gatekeep-
ers of 19 groups, 18 of which are based in Scotland.3 In three groups, the gatekeeper role 
was shared by two individuals. In each case, both individuals were interviewed. The groups 
that were interviewed included all 17 that are publicly listed on lInC Scotland’s website. Two 
additional groups were interviewed. one was a UK-wide group with a very active Scottish 
branch but has no association with lInC. The other group is a Scottish Co-investment Fund 
(SCIF) partner that also has no association with lInC. There were also three other groups 
that were members of lInC Scotland but preferred anonymity. These groups were also invited 
to participate, via lInC Scotland, but declined to do so. At the time that the research was 
undertaken (2012–2013), there were 24 angel groups identified in what was then the most 
recent Scottish Risk Capital Market Report (Young Company Finance 2012). The groups not 
included in this study had either closed or were private offices of high net worth families 
whose investments and operations are much closer to venture capital investing than angel 
investing. The study therefore captured the vast majority of the participants in the market 
at the time that the study was undertaken.
Securing the participation of such a high proportion of angel groups in the Scottish 
market was a considerable achievement. In many cases, the initial response was not positive 
and follow-up approaches were required. As a consequence, the recruitment process took 
three months. It started with an initial email to the gatekeeper to request an interview. In 
several cases, it was not possible to identify the gatekeeper, but in these cases, the recipient 
of the email forwarded it to the relevant individual.
of the 22 interviewees, 20 were face to face and 2 were conducted on the telephone. All 
respondents agreed for the interview to be recorded for later transcribing. The interviews 
ranged in length from 37 to 93 min, with the average being about one hour. The face-to-face 
interviews took place at a location of the interviewee’s convenience. Venues included the 
group’s office, coffee shops and the researcher’s office. We agreed with participants that 
information on individual groups would not be disclosed and that findings would be aggre-
gated. Any references to specific groups are therefore based on information that is in the 
public domain (e.g. media; presentations).
one of the main challenges of qualitative methods, such as interviews, is how to analyse 
the information that is collected. Several sections of the interviews were based on collecting 
quantifiable data, such as the amount invested, number of deals and age of the group. 
However, other parts of the questionnaire, notably on the skills that a gatekeeper requires 
and their own learning in the role, were based on opinions and perceptions. This information 
has been examined by thematic analysis (Howitt and Cramer 2007) for ‘identifying, analyzing 
and reporting patterns within data’ (Braun and Clarke (2006, 79). Boyatzis (1998) describes 
the technique as a process of ‘encoding qualitative information’.
Angel groups in Scotland: growth and investment activity
The paper is largely based on Scotland.4 This is a particularly appropriate context in which 
to undertake this study. Scotland has experienced a rapid growth in the number of angel 
groups. The initial groups – Archangels and Braveheart – were established in the 1990s. In 
2002, lInC Scotland’s membership comprised 300 solo angels and these two groups which 
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had about 70 angel members between them. By 2016, lInC Scotland had 21 groups in 
membership5, which it estimates comprise about 750 investors in total. As noted above, 
there are a small number of other groups that are not members of lInC Scotland. A handful 
of other groups have also been established but subsequently either closed or amalgamated. 
Individual membership of lInC Scotland is now below 100. At the time of the survey (2012–
2013), nearly one-third (six, or 30%) of the groups that were interviewed were three years 
old or less, underlining the recent growth in the formation of groups. Collectively, the 18 
Scottish groups had just over 1000 members, although this will include some double count-
ing of investors who are members of more than one group. Two groups have significant 
numbers of non-Scottish-based members. Membership ranges from less than 10 to over 
100. Reflecting the skewed nature of the angel markets,6 the five groups with more than 100 
members account for 70% of the total (Figure 1).
Two key drivers in the Scottish environment have resulted in this significant increase in 
angel group. First, lInC Scotland was created7 in 1992 as part of the Scottish Business Birth 
Rate Strategy (Brown and Mason, 2012) as a conventional business angel network, respon-
sible for both the demand and supply sides of the market and seeking to make ‘introductions’ 
between investors and entrepreneurs that would lead to investments. Some 10 years later, 
Scottish enterprise took increasing responsibility for the demand side, leaving lInC Scotland 
with an agreed remit to develop the supply side of the market. It took the strategic decision, 
influenced by the early successes of Braveheart and Archangels, that this would be most 
effectively achieved through the development of angel groups. Scottish enterprise co-funds 
certain activities with lInC but does not provide core funding. lInC’s main sources of funding 
come from the european Regional Development Fund (eRDF)8 and the private sector.
lInC actively sought to encourage its individual investors to band together. The older, 
established groups were willing to share their knowledge with the new groups. This helps 
explain why, as we comment later, most of the groups have similar operating models. The 
visibility of angel groups and publicity for lInC’s activities created a momentum and other 
Figure 1. Size distribution of angel syndicate membership. Source: compiled from interviews.
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groups emerged independently of lInC’s efforts. These new groups typically grew out of 
existing groups of investors who were already working together informally and so had a 
‘club’ mentality. However, they were required to find a chairman/gatekeeper, either from 
their own members or, less commonly, externally in order to start investing. lInC Scotland 
was able to provide financial support to new angel groups on account of its access to eRDF 
funding.
The second driver was the SCIF which came on stream in 2003 in response to the acute 
shortage of risk capital in the aftermath of the dot.com crash. The SCIF was designed to 
invest alongside private sector investment partners on a pari passu basis, investing up to £1 
for every £1 invested by the partner to a maximum of £1 m per business (and with the 
introduction of follow-on funding from the Venture Fund, deal sizes can be even larger). The 
intention was to improve liquidity in the market, enabling partners to make bigger invest-
ments, or follow-on investments, and freeing up part of their funds to invest in new busi-
nesses rather than follow-on investments. The SCIF carried out due diligence on prospective 
partners before accepting them onto the scheme. The partners make their own investment 
decisions. SCIF does not undertake its own analysis on the investments that the partners 
propose to make. Their only decision was to confirm that the business fell within the rules 
of the scheme. The eligibility criteria were known to investors. Partners could seek initial 
approval of a prospective investment’s eligibility in principle at an early stage in their 
appraisal process. once investment terms were agreed by the partner, SCIF approval, or not, 
was generally made within 24 hours of bringing an investment to the fund. This high level 
of certainty was built into the scheme following consultation with the initial angel groups 
and, arguably, has been a key feature of its success.9 Although angel groups accounted for 
less than half of the fund’s investment partners, the fund’s maximum investment limit meant 
that the vast majority of the deals that qualified were brought by angel groups rather than 
VCFs (Harrison 2009).
The existence of the SCIF encouraged the emergence of groups in two respects. First, the 
SCIF wanted to expand its number of investment partners, so welcomed the formation of 
new groups, especially in areas of the country where they were lacking. lInC Scotland was 
specifically contracted to support the creation of three new groups per annum to be 
co-investment partners. Second, angel groups received a 2.5% fee on completion of every 
co-investment deal that they participated in. This provided useful additional income to fund 
a group’s running costs, supporting salaries of a gatekeeper and possibly one or more 
administrative staff.
Investment activity by angel groups has grown steadily since 2002–2003, in terms of both 
number and amount invested, peaking in 2010 with 101 deals compared with just 22 in 
2002–2003. Investment activity has recovered since then, albeit erratically, with 98 deals in 
2015 (Figure 2). only part of the recent rise in investments is due to activity of new groups 
that did not exist in 2010 (these groups made eight investments in 2012). Moreover, invest-
ment activity is skewed to a small number of groups, with just two groups making 69% of 
the investments in the period 2009–2012. Almost every other group made less than 10 new 
investments in the period (i.e. excluding follow-on investments). The amount invested by 
members of the angel groups has risen from £6.3 m in 2002–2003 to a peak of £26.17 m in 
2011, and recovering to £19.04 in 2015 (Figure 3). Total aggregate investment (i.e. including 
co-investors) has increased even more sharply, from £6.8 m in 2002–2003 to what was then 
a peak of £34.5 m in 2011. Investment activity recovered quickly to reach a new peak of 
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£44.5 m in 2015 (Figure 4), reflecting both the growth of the SCIF and the increasing tendency 
for angel groups to co-invest with other investors. This represents a significant part of the 
risk capital market in Scotland (Harrison, Don, and Johnston 2010). looking at the market 
as a whole, the Scottish Risk Capital reports show that VCFs dominate, accounting for well 
over half of investments by value in the period 2009–2014. Angels, by contrast, have 
accounted for between 10 and 15% (Table 1). This reflects the focus of VCFs on large 
Figure 2. number of investments made by angel groups in Scotland, 2000–2015. Source: linC Scotland.
Figure 3. total aggregate transaction value of angel group investments in Scotland from 2000 to 2015. 
Source: linC Scotland.
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investments. However, angels dominate the middle market which covers investments in the 
£100,000–£2 m range. In the 2012–2014 period, angels (groups and individuals) made nearly 
three times the number made by VCFs, and invested 1.3 times the amount invested by VCFs 
(Table 2). Moreover, much of the investment in the public sector category comprises the 
SCIF which has largely invested alongside angel groups.
of course these investments represent only a fraction of the investment opportunities 
that the groups see. The number of opportunities seen by the groups in the 12 months prior 
to the interview ranges from under 10 (due to circumstances specific to that group) to over 
250. However, the majority of groups saw between 40 and 150 investment opportunities 
(median = 100). no doubt some opportunities will be seen by more than one group. The 
overall ‘yield rate’ – investments as a proportion of opportunities seen invested – was about 
6.5%. This is significantly lower than the equivalent data reported by Sohl (2013) for US angel 
groups for the same time period. Assuming that the difference is real, rather due to data or 
Figure 4. amounts invested by angel groups in Scotland, 2000–2015. Source: linC Scotland.
Table 1. Venture capital investment in Scotland, 2009–2014: number of investments and amount in-
vested (£m).
Source: Young Company Finance (2015).
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
£m % £m % £m % £m % £m % £m %
angels 14 13.2 17 13.4 15 16.7 17 14.5 15 7.4 26 10.7
Venture 
capital/
institutions
53 50.0 76 59.8 48 53.3 69 59.0 155 76.7 157 64.3
Scottish 
enterprise/
public
31 29.2 24 18.9 18 20.0 21 17.9 21 10.4 49 20.1
Other 8 7.5 10 7.9 9 10.0 10 8.5 11 5.4 12 4.9
total 106 100 127 100 90 100 117 100 202 100 244 100
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definitional differences, there are several possible explanations for this difference. It may 
reflect the poorer quality of opportunities that Scottish groups see, their more risk-averse 
screening and selection standards or the superior investment capabilities of US groups (in 
terms of numbers of members and dollars available for investment).
Angel groups typically invest anywhere from £25,000 to £500,000 per round, with a few 
outliers at each end. However, as the vast majority (85%) of deals had co-investors – almost 
invariably the SCIF – so deal sizes were larger. nevertheless, more than 90% of deals in 
2009–2010 were below £1 m (the maximum allowable transaction under SCIF regulations). 
The majority of this investment is follow-on funding. This peaked at over 80% at the start of 
the financial crisis but has fallen back since then to around 60% (Figure 5).
Scottish angel groups have a diverse range of investment preferences. This is particularly 
apparent in terms of sector, where two categories of groups can be identified. Six (of the 18) 
are specifically oriented to technology sectors, with some having a very specific investment 
focus (e.g. biopharmaceuticals, energy and/or life science) and two others have a ‘preference’ 
for technology. The remainder will invest in ‘everything’ or ‘everything except X’. There is less 
diversity in terms of the stage of development, with 15 groups looking to invest in early 
Table 2. Venture capital investments between £100,000 and £2 million 2012–2014: number of invest-
ments and amounts invested (£m).
Source: Young Company Finance (2015).
number of investments Amount invested £m
number % £m %
angels 230 32.9 50.1 33.1
Venture capitalists 80 11.4 37.2 24.6
Other private 120 17.2 17.8 11.8
public sector 269 38.5 46.3 30.6
total 699 100 151.4
Figure 5. Follow-on vs. first round investments. Source: linC Scotland.
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stage or start-up businesses. Two groups are focused on proof of concept and seed stages. 
There is also diversity in the size of investment. Three groups stated this was ‘unlimited’, two 
groups would invest up to £500,000 and three would go up to £1 m. However, the majority 
of groups are looking to invest under £250,000 per deal, not including any co-investment. 
Finally, the majority (12) of groups are looking to invest in Scotland, although in a few cases, 
this was ‘not exclusive’. Four groups reported that they would invest worldwide, confirming 
that while angel investing is a local phenomenon, it is not exclusively so (Harrison, Mason 
and Robson 2010)
Follow-on investments have quickly dominated the investment activity of angel groups 
(Mason and Harrison 2010, 2011; Sohl 2012). This may be a ‘natural’ process, reflecting a 
combination of the financial strength of angel groups to make follow-on investments and 
the lack of alternative investors to provide follow-on funding (Harrison, Don and Johnston 
2010). However, some groups have turned down the opportunity to bring institutional inves-
tors into deals because of fears of both being diluted and also losing control of the invest-
ment, particularly the ability to influence, manage and control the exit. The need to invest 
in ordinary shares so that investors qualify for tax relief under the enterprise Investment 
Scheme is a further discouragement to seek follow-on funding from institutional investors. 
As discussed earlier, these investors will invest using preference shares and other more com-
plex instruments which give them greater power over investors with ordinary shares.
Angel group investment processes
The investment process of angel groups is rather different to that of individual angels. 
Previous research has established that individual angels undertake an initial screening pro-
cess to establish whether the proposal is a good fit with their investment criteria and would 
appear to have merit. This is typically a fast process, taking anything from one to twenty 
minutes (Mason and Rogers 1997; Harrison, Smith, and Mason 2015), and upwards of 90% 
of proposals get rejected at this stage (Feeney, Haines, and Riding 1999). Those proposals 
that get through the initial screening are then investigated in detail.
The investment process of angel groups is rather more extended and involves more 
stages. Two distinct approaches are apparent amongst the Scottish groups, although there 
are differences of detail in each approach. In both cases, the gatekeeper is the initial point 
of contact for the business. The gatekeeper then undertakes the initial screening role. At its 
most basic, this may simply be to filter businesses against the group’s key investment criteria. 
In other cases, it is more proactive with the gatekeeper assessing the business plan and in 
some cases contacting the entrepreneur to gather information about the company. In some 
groups, the gatekeeper may be assisted by one of the members, perhaps to bring in sector 
expertise.
The differences in approach occur at the next stage. In some groups, the businesses that 
get through the filtering and initial screening processes are evaluated in detail by a small 
group of the angels. This may include a presentation by the entrepreneur to this inner core. 
They will make a collective decision whether or not to invest in the business themselves. If 
this inner core decides unanimously to invest, then the opportunity is opened up to the rest 
of the group for each member to decide individually whether they also want to invest. This 
approach is typified by Archangels (Gregson, Mann, and Harrison 2013a). In the alternative 
approach, those businesses that get past the screening stage are presented to the group 
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members. Typically, the company will make a presentation. Some groups will coach the 
entrepreneurs prior to the presentation. each individual member then makes their own 
decision whether or not they are interested in investing. If there is sufficient interest, then a 
sub-group is established to do the due diligence and, if appropriate, negotiate the terms 
and conditions of the investment. The deal will then be brought back to the members to 
make individual decisions whether or not to invest.
The key difference between these two approaches is therefore who drives the process 
after the initial screening stage. In the first approach, it is driven by an active core group of 
angels, with the outer core only being invited to invest, on a take-it or leave-it basis, in those 
deals that the core group has decided to invest in. In the second approach, the members 
drive the process, with the gatekeeper undertaking due diligence on those businesses that 
the membership is interested in.
Compared with individual angels (Mason and Harrison 1996c), raising finance from angel 
groups is more costly for the entrepreneur. none of the Scottish groups require entrepreneurs 
to ‘pay to pitch’; however, four groups charge fees associated with the due diligence process 
and the majority of groups charge deal/completion fees when the investment is made (typ-
ically 3% of the amount raised) (10 groups) and also levy ongoing non-executive director 
monitoring fees (11 groups).
This investment process has a number of implications for entrepreneurs seeking finance 
from angel groups. First, there are more people involved in the process and hence more 
people have to be persuaded of the merits of the investment opportunity. Second, gate-
keepers have the power to reject investment opportunities, but it is the members who make 
the decision to invest. The entrepreneur has therefore to get past the gatekeeper in order 
to reach potential investors. Third, in contrast to traditional business angel networks, where 
the pitch to an audience of potential investors is at the start of the process and is used by 
the investors as the initial screening process, with angel groups, the pitching stage occurs 
later in the process after the business has passed the initial screen. This, in turn, has impli-
cations for the content and style of the pitch. Fourth, raising finance from angel groups 
incurs fees, whereas this would not typically be the case with individual angels. However, 
business angel networks also charge fees. Finally, given the various stages and different 
people involved, the length of time to secure an investment from an angel group will gen-
erally be longer than in the case of individual angels.
The gatekeeper
The previous discussion has highlighted the critical role of the group gatekeeper in the 
investment process, managing both the day-to-day operations of the group and, more sig-
nificantly, controlling access to investors. The emergence of this new actor is one of the most 
significant outcomes of the growth of angel groups, with considerable implications both 
for scholars who continue to focus on how individual angels make their investment decisions 
and also for entrepreneurs. Gatekeepers are of two types: member gatekeepers and manager 
gatekeepers (Paul and Whittam 2010). Gatekeepers have typically emerged from within the 
group that initially started the angel group. In half of the groups (9) that were interviewed, 
members act as managers (more than half of whom receive remuneration), five groups (28%) 
have hired an external manager and in the remaining four groups, the gatekeeper role is 
shared between a member and someone that has been hired. The bigger groups have 
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appointed external managers as they became larger. Some groups have gone further, hiving 
off a separate administrator function from the gatekeeper’s role. Indeed, in 11 of the 18 
groups (61%), the role of gatekeeper is shared. The implication is that the gatekeeper function 
changes as the group’s activities increase and portfolio management becomes a more 
time-consuming and critical function.
The gatekeeper undertakes a variety of functions (Table 3). Two-thirds of gatekeepers 
undertake external-facing roles, notably the promotion of the group to attract new investors 
and entrepreneurs. Around half also report that they undertake internal roles, mostly inter-
acting and communicating with the members. However, their main functions are associated 
with managing the investment process. Gatekeepers review the business plans and executive 
summaries that they receive from entrepreneurs seeking finance, decide whether they meet 
the investment criteria of the group, may seek additional information and even meet the 
entrepreneur and ultimately make the decision whether the opportunity is passed on to the 
group members, whether an inner core or the entire group, to be considered for investment. 
The gatekeeper may also be responsible for preparing one or more supporting papers on 
the business for the group. The gatekeeper will also follow up with members to gauge their 
interest in the opportunity. In the second model, discussed in the previous section, if the 
group is interested in the business, then the gatekeeper will also be involved in the due 
diligence process and even in the negotiation. It is of note that fewer than half of the gate-
keepers are involved in the process after the investment is made. Specifically, few gatekeep-
ers see the preparation of investee companies for an exit being as being part of their role 
(Mason and Botelho 2016). The norm is for a member of the group to take on the role of 
non-executive director in the investee company. It is only in the larger groups, which have 
more support staff, that the gatekeeper is involved in portfolio management. The majority 
(17 out of 21, or 81%) undertake this function on a part-time basis (less 30 h a week).
The backgrounds of the gatekeepers are remarkably varied. There is considerable variety 
in academic expertise, albeit with a bias to accounting, finance and law. Just under half 
reported work experience in banking, accountancy or corporate finance. eleven (52%) had 
entrepreneurial experience and 15 (71%) have personal experience of making angel 
Table 3. Gatekeeper roles.
Source: compiled from interviews.
General function
Proportion of gatekeepers 
citing this role Detailed function
Proportion of total  
comments
1. external 66.7 Marketing 5.5
promotion 6.3
recruitment 2.4
2. internal 52.4 interaction with members 0.8
Organisation of the process 1.6
internal communication 7.9
administrative 7.9
3. investment process 100.0 Sourcing 7.1
Screening 21.3
Due diligence 11.0
negotiation 7.1
post-investment 7.9
exiting 3.1
Others 8.7
4. Organisational 19.0 Creation of group 0.8
Development of group 0.8
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investments, reflecting the presence of a number of member angels as gatekeepers. The 
vast majority thought they were prepared for the role (95%), although those in the longer 
established groups were actually pioneers, defining and shaping the role.
Conclusion and implications
Angel investing is changing from an invisible and largely individual process to one in which 
angels are joining together in organised and managed groups to invest. This is evident 
throughout the world (May and liu 2016), although the pace of change has varied between 
countries. Yet, despite the growing significance of angel groups as a major source of finance 
for entrepreneurial companies at the start of the so-called funding escalator, little scholarly 
attention has been devoted to this development, despite the possibility that it renders much 
of the existing research base redundant. nor has there been much consideration of the 
practical consequences of this change either for entrepreneurs and investors nor the policy 
implications. This paper is the first attempt to provide an in-depth examination of the growth 
of angel groups and the implications for the financing of entrepreneurial ventures.
The paper draws on evidence from Scotland where, for a variety of reasons, the emergence 
of angel groups has proceeded further than anywhere else outside of the USA. Indeed, in 
both absolute numbers and on a per capita basis, Scotland’s population of angel groups is 
larger than that of the majority of US states. The latest Risk Capital Market Report (Young 
Company Finance 2015) identifies 21 angel groups in Scotland compared with just 2 prior 
to 2000. Angels, alongside the co-investment fund, dominate investment activity in the 
£100,000–£2 m range. However, activity is skewed to a minority of larger and longer estab-
lished groups.
Implications for the supply of entrepreneurial finance
The existing debate about the implications of the growth of angel groups mainly focuses 
on the benefits, notably their greater visibility and greater professionalism compared with 
individual angels, which, it is argued, reduces the time and cost for the entrepreneur of 
raising finance. In addition, it is thought to have expanded the supply of informal venture 
capital by attracting passive investors who lack the capabilities to invest on their own. 
However, others have raised the concern that the essence of angel investing is at risk of 
being lost as the process becomes more organised. Some have also expressed the concern 
that the angel market could evolve in the same way as VCFs, shifting to making larger and 
later stage investments and losing its ability to add value.
our evidence is finely balanced. on the supply side, the process has reduced the number 
of investment decision-makers in the market as individual angels have joined angel groups. 
It has probably also reduced the number of investments of £50,000 and below which are 
too small to be of interest to the groups. However, equity crowdfunding may fill this gap 
(Tuomi and Harrison, Forthcoming). Groups have focused on making larger investments and 
follow-on investments, with the latter dominating investment activity. The continued crea-
tion of new groups is therefore needed to mobilise new capital into the market to make new 
investments. on the other hand, the greater investment capability of angel groups has 
helped fill the funding gap created by the decline of VCFs specialising in seed, start-up and 
early stage financing. From a process point of view, angel groups extend the investment 
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process, adding more stages and increasing the decision-time, and the gatekeeper now 
controls access to the angels. Moreover, market deficiencies remain. The emergence of angel 
groups, with government support, has helped resolve the ‘traditional’ equity gap (originally 
under £250,000 but other definitions have put this figure closer to £1 m). However, it has 
opened up a ‘second’ equity gap (Murray 1994; Sohl 2012) above £1–£2 m for growth capital, 
beyond the capability of virtually all angel groups, even with syndication. This is a challenge 
for angel-backed companies requiring growth capital to fulfil their potential and may result 
in their premature sale to overseas companies to the possible detriment of both investors 
and the regional economy.
Moreover, Scotland’s angel market may be out of equilibrium. First, the availability of 
eRDF funding may have resulted in too many angel groups being created for the available 
investment opportunities. Second, it may have resulted in too many manager-led groups 
and limited involvement of individual members in contrast to the USA where there appears 
to be greater member involvement. Third, some of the angel groups may not be financially 
sustainable, certainly without the public sector support they receive. The groups most at 
risk are those that have expensive manager-gatekeeper functions and a process that is not 
sufficiently ruthless at the initial screening stage, combined with the lack of sufficient volume 
of investment activity to generate fee income. A further concern is that some groups appear 
to be evolving, not to become VCFs, as Sohl (2007, 2012) feared, but fund managers. Two 
Scottish groups have already made this transformation.10
Finally, what has been the economic impact of Scotland’s much admired business angel 
market? The support that the angel market has received from the public sector both through 
eRDF funding and indirectly via the enterprise Investment Scheme means that this question 
cannot be ignored. However, we lack sufficient evidence to make a judgement on what 
represents ‘success’. Taking the ‘glass half empty’ viewpoint, a strong case can be made that 
the impact has been disappointing. Investors have achieved relatively few exits (Mason and 
Botelho 2016) and most of these have been small, with the consequence that little wealth 
has been created for recycling in new ventures, and management learning in a growth 
company context has been truncated. Moreover, their investments have not led to the cre-
ation of ‘companies of scale’, a key focus of Scottish enterprise policy over the past decade 
(Brown and Mason 2012). The riposte from angel groups is that this is not their role. Moreover, 
the M&A market is dominated by small exits which give a good return to investors (Gray 
2012). Furthermore, the ability of angel groups to build ‘companies of scale’ is limited. These 
companies are likely to require significant additional amounts of finance and therefore carry 
a significant dilution risk for angels and also require appropriately experienced manage-
ment.11 This highlights the challenges in aligning the objectives of policy-makers and the 
practices of the angel community. A glass ‘half full’ perspective would argue that Scotland 
has stumbled upon an effective model of angel investing that overcomes the limitations of 
its angel market imposed by its historic low level of entrepreneurial activity (Paul, Whittam, 
and Johnston 2003). This model makes efficient use of its limited number of active angels 
to serve as nodes to cluster less knowledgeable money of high-income individuals typically 
in the professions and who are looking for tax-efficient investments. In the absence of such 
groups, it is quite possible that this money will have been invested with the traditional fund 
managers who will not have channelled it either to entrepreneurial businesses or within 
Scotland.12
338  C. MASon eT Al.
Implications for policy
The emergence of angel groups has several implications for policy-makers seeking to pro-
mote angel investing. First, they need to choose whether to support angel groups and, if 
they are supporting BAns, whether support for angel groups (e.g. to cover their running 
costs) would be more effective. Both models result in entrepreneurs receiving funding from 
angel investors. From a public policy perspective, the evidence on the relative effectiveness 
of these models is not clear-cut. Moreover, there are different angel group models to those 
developed in Scotland. For example, Halo in northern Ireland13 has developed a model in 
which they act as the first selection gate for angel groups, inviting them to large pitching 
events, while other groups that are not members of Halo will form an outer ‘ring’ to ‘bulk up’ 
the investments led by the groups. However, it is clear that angel groups need to be in place 
for a co-investment fund approach to work. Second, where tax incentives are available for 
angel investors, these typically only apply when angels are investing directly in businesses 
(as in the case in the UK). It is therefore appropriate to ask whether tax incentives should 
also be available to angels to invest in pooled investment vehicles to enable angel groups 
to build sidecar funds. This is significant in the content of the emergence of a finance gap 
in the £1–£5 m range. Third, context matters. lInC Scotland’s access to eRDF has been critical 
in terms of the number and diversity of angel groups that have been created, and the dom-
inance of manager-led models. The co-investment fund, which has been successfully repli-
cated elsewhere (new Zealand; Canada), has also been critical.
Implications for research
These changes in the angel market have major implications for research on angel investing. 
First, who is attracted to join angel groups? There is a suggestion that they are attracting 
individuals who would not have become solo angels. Younger angels in particular are likely 
to start their investing career with a group rather than as a solo investor (Mason and Botelho 
2014). There is also emerging evidence that angels who invest as part of a community (i.e. 
who are members of groups or networks) manage their risk differently from those who invest 
on their own, notably in terms of their post-investment monitoring and involvement (Bonini 
et al. 2016). So, do members of groups fit the well-established profile of business angels? or 
is this profile now out-of-date? Specifically, are angels who are members of groups as active 
as solo angels in managing their investments, and do they have the same ability to add 
value? If not, then this challenges the view of business angels as ‘smart investors’. Moreover, 
given the increasing tendency for researchers to base their samples on angel group mem-
bers, it now begs the question whether this is an appropriate sampling frame. Is it meaningful 
to compare these investors with the angels profiled in prior research? or are they a different 
population?
Second, it is clear that angel groups are characterised by diversity, for example, in terms 
of management and investment processes. However, sampling of angels is typically restricted 
to a single angel group (and one group in particular).
Third, angel group investments typically involve more than one angel. However, much 
of the research continues to take a single angel perspective which seeks, for example, to 
explore the relationship between business angel characteristics and firm performance (Croce, 
Guerini and Ughetto 2016) or how the human capital of angels influences valuation 
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(Collewaert and Maingart 2016) based on data from just a single investor in each business. 
The growth in investing by angel groups undermines the appropriateness of this type of 
analyses based on a single angel investor in a company.
Fourth, the investment process of angel groups is different to that of solo angels, with 
more stages, more people involved and different people involved at different stages. This 
challenges the ongoing relevance of existing research on how business angels make their 
investment decisions. Moreover, there is evidence (Mason and Botelho 2014; Botelho, Mason, 
and Tagg 2015a) that members of angel groups are likely to be influenced in their investment 
decision either by the gatekeeper or other group members. Given evidence that business 
angels learn from the experience of others (Harrison, Smith, and Mason 2015) and conse-
quently may change the way they invest (Botelho, Mason, and Tagg 2015b) it may be, as 
suggested by Mason, Botelho, and Zygmunt (2016), that the emergence of angel groups is 
creating a unique opportunity for situated learning, potentially resulting in the emergence 
of a ‘community of practice’ (lave and Wenger 1991) with a shared repertoire of approaches 
to investing, resulting in a growing standardisation of investment assessment.
Fifth, the emergence of angel groups has created a new actor – the angel group manager 
– or gatekeeper – who plays a key role at the initial screening stage. emerging research 
suggests that they perform this role in ways that are subtly different to that of solo angels 
(Mason and Botelho 2017). Further research is needed on what is likely to be an evolving 
role.
Sixth, we do not know what the emergence of angel groups means for the post-investment 
relationship. If many of the group members are passive investors, does this create a ‘band 
width’ issue if this role is performed by a core group of angels? or, is the value-added 
contribution enhanced by the diversity of skills and knowledge in the group?
And finally, what are the broader implications for the early stage risk capital market of 
the emergence of angel groups? For example, how do they engage, if at all, with newer 
sources of finance such as crowdfunding platforms and accelerators? And can angel groups 
effectively fill the various funding gaps created by the demise of the traditional funding 
escalator (north, Baldock, and Ullah 2013; Baldock and Mason 2015; Gill 2015)?
Notes
1.  Just 11% of investments by the UK’s venture capital and private equity sector was in seed and 
start-ups with a further 28% in early stage deals (BVCA 2015).
2.  This is illustrated by a report from the Boston Business Journal (15 April 2013), headlined 
‘Common Angels eyes larger new fund, as group seeks to act more like a VC’ which describes 
how Common Angels, a group of about 50 angels in the Boston area, is in discussions to raise 
a pooled fund which will exceed its existing $13-m fund. The new fund would make a similar 
number of investments but would invest more capital into each business. The report also notes 
that it has centralised it decision-making in an eight-member committee. The report concludes 
that the end result of these changes is that ‘Common Angels is now operating more like a VC 
firm …’ (http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/startups/2013/04/commonangels-fund-
venture-capital-boston.html?page=2).
3.  Halo, which is based in northern Ireland, is also a member of lInC Scotland.
4.  Halo, the northern Ireland investment group, was also included as it is a member of lInC 
Scotland.
5.  Including Halo.
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6.  Many aspects of the angel market exhibit a skewed distribution; for example, returns (dominated 
by failures) and number of investments/amount invested (large number of investors with few 
investments).
7.  It was actually created out of an existing organisation operated by Glasgow opportunities to 
give it a pan-Scotland focus.
8.  lInC Scotland has enterprise agency status which gives it direct access to apply for eRDF 
funding.
9.  In contrast, the UK Angel Co-Fund does undertake its own evaluation, creating uncertainty 
for its partners. This is the main criticism made by investors of the scheme (owen and Mason, 
Forthcoming).
10.  For example, Braveheart, now listed on AIM, describes itself as follows: Braveheart Investment 
Group plc was formed in 1997 and has been quoted on the Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM: BRH.l) of the london Stock exchange since 2007. Headquartered in Perth, Scotland, it 
also has offices in Yorkshire. The Group has around £71 m of funds under management across 
various regional and national funds and runs investment syndicates which Braveheart and 
its operating companies have established. The Group provides equity, loan and mezzanine 
funding to small- and medium-sized enterprises. Braveheart also invests on behalf of HnWIs, 
family offices, institutional investors and public sector organisations across the UK and europe. 
(http://www.braveheartgroup.co.uk/about-us/).
11.  See Gregson, Carr, and Harrison (2013) for the case of one business angel-backed company 
that did become a company of scale and floated on the london Stock Market. In 2015, it was 
acquired by a Japanese company (Financial Times 2015).
12.  We are grateful to David Grahame, oBe, Ceo of lInC Scotland , for this observation.
13.  http://www.nisp.co.uk/halo/about/.
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